THREE PROPOSALS TO HARNESS PRIVATE INFORMATION IN CONTRACT
IANAYREs* How should judges decide contract cases when they realize that private parties know more about what is good for them than the judges themselves know? This is a crucial question in structuring contract law, because if judges knew private valuations, we could dispose of contracts altogether and simply let judges order welfare-maximizing trade. Savvy judges, however, realize that they are normally less informed than private litigants and will accordingly be prone to error in deciding cases. The famed "nirvana fallacy"! appears when judges or commentators forget that it is difficult for third parties to identify the social optimum. How then should judges operating under conditions of relative ignorance avoid the nirvana fallacy?
My general (but rather uninteresting) answer is that judges deciding contract cases should harness the parties' private information. This is not a new answer. In some ways it is the idea behind the theory of efficient breach. Expectation damages encourage a promisor to breach only when her information tells her that breach is likely to be efficient. 2 * Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. ayres@mail.law.ya!e.edu. Allan Farnsworth, Eric Posner, and Alan Schwartz provided helpful comments.
1. The "'nixvana fallacy'" occurs when one compares the failings of the unregulated market to some "'ideal institution [that] Here is where the counteroffer rule comes into play. The rule discourages offcrees who know there are gains of trade from continuing to bargain-but does not discourage offerees who are nying to learn whether there are gains of trade. Offerees who know there are gains of trade risk losing a valuable option when they make a counteroffer, but offerees who receive an offer less favorable than their BAlNA do not give up anything when they destroy an offer they would never accept. The counteroffer rule thus dissuades offerees from continuing to bargain when they know that bargaining is inefficient (merely for the purpose ofredistributing gains of trade) while not discouraging efficlent bargaining (for the purpose of discovering whether gains of trade exist). This analysis of the counteroffer rule was proposed in rough form by Ben Burman in his first semester contracts course at Yale Law School. The idea that contract law should discourage individual parties from taking actions that they know to be socially inefficient is parallel to later discussion ofusing inalienable injunction to discourage parties from threatening performance they know to be inefficient. See infra, text accompanying notes 22-28. 4. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) . a sufficient condition for producing the contractual result desired by the losing side.
Routinely providing interpretive safe harbors would be a judicial innovation. Judicial opinions in contract cases almost never include this information. This failure to provide alternative contractual language is particularly striking where the parties have tried to contract around a default obligation but the court rules that their efforts were insufficient to displace the default. For example, in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co./ the litigants added language to a fonn contract, apparently in an attempt to contract around the "diminution in value" damage measure that applies in absence of agreement to the 6 contrary. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the contract's additional language was not sufficient to avoid the "diminution in value" default and create "cost of performance" damages instead. Even if the court's substantive decision was correct,1 the court erred by not indicating to future contractors what words would be sufficient to produce a cost of performance result.
Interpretive safe harbors harness the private information of prospective contractors. Safe harbors reduce the costs ofjudicial mistakes, because future parties can easily avoid the inefficiencies of bad decisions by simply using the magic words.R Moreover, providing language sufficient to produce an alternative result protects freedom of contract. Safe harbors make clear that the court's holding is not an immutable or mandatory rule. Charles Goetz and Robert Scott have documented the tendency of courts to change default rules into immutable rules that are impossible for future parties to avoid. 7. There are strong reasons tojudge it incorrect. A cost ofperformance interpretation would have given the repeat and more powerful player (for eXample, the coal company) a better incentive to inform the other party when the only measure ofdamages might be diminution in value. 8. A participant at the Symposium worried that Uninformed parties might unwittingly use the magic words to produce an unintended result. This should not be a problem as long as the safe harbor .language conforms to common understandings. Alternatively, if the magic words included a reference to the case citation itself ("Contrary to Peevylwuse, we intend to award cost ofperformance damages."), ignorant litigants would not be able to blunder into the safe harbor. A practice of announcing alternative language would 'Work against this tendency and force courts to state more directly when (and why) they were choosing to displace freedom of contract. By thus reinforcing future parties' freedom to structure their contractual obligations as they see fit, interpretative safe harbors are consonant with judicial constraint. 'While urging the judiciary to decide the legal import of alternative contractual words smacks ofjudicial activism, in the realm of contractjudges effectively eschew power by telling prospective parties how they might alternatively order their respective obligations.
At the Symposium, I pointed to the famous language in Miranda as an example of how courts can usefully provide safe harbor language.to Several audience members reflexively retorted that any proposal analogized to Miranda must be bad. But especially ifyou do not think the government should have a duty to warn suspects, the Court's willingness to provide a safe harbor warning mitigated the harm of the decision. Imagine how much worse the Miranda decision would have been if the Court had told police to warn suspects, but refused to articulate what type ofwarning would be sufficient.
In recent years, a number of federal circuits have begun routinely analyzing the standard of review even though choosing between different standards of review is often not necessary to decide particular cases. This simple change has quickly provided a wealth of new law, as evinced by an exploding West Key Number. A similar practice of routinely analyzing how the losing litigant might have achieved its proffered interpretation could give future contractors the option of prospectively overruling misguidedjudicial decisions by contracting around them.
II. EXTENDING HADLEY
The Hadley v. Baxendale principle of limiting damages to those that are foreseeable is such a good idea that we should allow buyers to benefit from it as well as sellers. Currently, sellers can use the Hadley principle to limit the amount of their damages when they have breached.J1 Rather bizarrely, there is no 10. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 467-70 (1966) . 11. In Hadley itself. the seller-carrier was able to reduce its liability for failing to deliver on time.
analogous rule to benefit buyers. When buyers breach contracts, they cannot limit the sellers' damages only to those that are reasonably foreseeable.
The possibility of a seller claiming unforeseeable damages is particularly probable when the seller is claiming damages for lost profit. Since the seller's mark-up is often not known by the buyer/ 2 awarding lost profit can at times subject a buyer to considerable uncertainty about the consequences of breaching. Imagine, for example, that you have contracted to purchase a speed boat (as in Neri v. Retail Marine Corp.J:\ but have had a change of heart and are considering whether or not to breach. It may be extremely difficult for you to predict your potential damages because courts will not limit lost-profit damages to those that were reasonably foreseeable.
A bit ofpersonaI narrative underscores the buyer's dilemma. I once negotiated with Orkin Corporation to have monthly pesticide treatment for my home. Orkin insisted that they would enter only into year-long contracts. However, I was thinking about moving to another city in six months. So like a good Holmesian, I asked "What would be the consequences if I breach? What are you going to claim as lost profits?» Orkin, of course, steadfastly refused to tell me what the damages would be. Even when buyers inquire, they are not protected by the Hadley principle. And a story similar to my pesticide experience could be told with regard to a number of different transactions, including, for example, Book-ofthe-Month Club agreements and cellular phone contracts.
What then explains why Hadley only protects sellers? If we move beyond the rather arid doctrinal characterization that a seller's lost profits are not considered to be' "consequential» damages,14 there is a substantive distinction concerning the contract price. Consequential damages for a seller's breach can be significantly larger than the contract price, while lost profits for a buyer's breach can never exceed this price. Hence, the contract price itself puts an upper bound on potential damages . HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 21 that a buyer might have to pay. Sellers need the Hadley principle more because neither the price nor any other contractual term provides a ceiling for a seller's potential liability.
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Yet admitting that sellers need Hadley protection more than buyers does not establish that it is unwise to extend the principle. In competitive markets, lost-profit damages 'Would be a small fraction of the total price. Accordingly, the structural damage cap provides relatively weak protection against lostprofit damages substantially exceeding the amounts that a consumer foresaw. For example, in buying a new car for $25,000, a breaching buyer can take little solace in the fact that her lost-profit liability cannot be above $25,000. The possibility of seller's lost-profit damages of three, five, or eight thousand dollars would still be largely unforeseen by many buyers.
Breaching buyers who face large lost-profit have some hope of reducing their damages by claiming that the initial contract was unconscionable. Unconscionability, however, (like the structural damage ceiling) is a poor substitute for the Hadley principle. Contracts are almost never struck down for unconscionable price terms. 15 Moreover, there is a substantive difference between an unconscionable profit and an unforeseeable profit. A wide range of seller markups that are substantively conscionable might still be unforeseeable. 16 At the end of the day, the" current rules governing lost-profit damages might subject buyers to substantial, unforeseeable damages, even when buyers make inquiry.
The Hadley principle would mitigate this problem by making damages more foreseeable. Because the Hadley principle is a default rule, limiting sellers' liability to foreseeable damages gives buyers an incentive to inform sellers of their idiosyncratic sensitivity to sellers' breach, and often leads to avoidance of the default rule through the use of a liquidated damages clause in the initial contract. The Hadley principle thus has an information-forcing quality that harnesses the private Analogously, extending the Hadley principle to protect buyers would harness the private infonnation of sellers. Limiting sellers' lost-profit damages to those that were reasonably foreseeable would encourage sellers to disclose unusually high markups.IS Such disclosure would promote efficiency by letting buyers calculate how much effort they should expend to avoid breach. When there is a high probability that a buyer will need to breach (as in my Orkin example), disclosure of lost-profit damages through a liquidated damages provision would give the buyer a better sense of whether the contract was on net beneficial. To be sure, some sellers contracting for high profits under a Hadley regime ,vill prefer to take the chance of non-disclosure (and reduced damages if the buyer breaches) rather than infonn the buyer of a high markup. Therefore, it might be even advisable to go beyond the Hadley default and institute a zerodollar default for lost profits.
19 Sellers would remain free to contract for full lost-profit damages by means of appropriate disclosure in a liquidated damages clause. Even if the Hadley or zero-dollar defaults did not induce disclosure, these defaults would at least promote equity by exposing buyers only to those damages that were reasonably foreseeable.
At the Symposium, Eric Posner was surprised to hear me suggest extending the Hadley principle, because Rob Gertner and I had previously shown that the Hadley principle was the efficient default for seller's breach only under certain conditions. 20 Yet given the widespread acceptance of this principle on grounds of equity as well as efficiency, it is difficult to argue that it should not be extended to protect buyers. Indeed, once the Hadley default is seen as an informationforcing or pro-disclosure rule, the current state of the law seems 
m. INALIENABLE INJUNCIlONS
Whenever a judge uses his equitable power to grant an injunction, he should give the party against whom the injunction is running the option of making the injunction inalienable.
22 As an empirical matter, a substantial proportion of injunctions are purchased, not performed. Plaintiffs seeking injunctions often do not 'want the injunction for its own sake, but instead want to use the threat of forced performance as bargaining leverage to extract a payment from the defendant larger than any monetary damages the court might award.
Myriad examples of this phenomenon come to mind,23 but to focus on a specific context, consider the classic encroachment case of Pile v. Pedrick.24 In Pile, the subterranean foundation of the defendant's brick wall encroached one and three-eighths inches underneath the plaintiff's property. As is routine in such circumstances, the plaintiff landowner brought suit seeking an injunction to remove the wall and rejected the option of monetary damages. Because monetary damages were likely to be only one-t\ventieth the cost of moving the fence (say, $500 as likely monetary damages versus $10,000 to move the foundation), an injunction might allow the plaintiff to extract from the defendant a sum substantially above the likely monetaIy damages amount.
What is striking about cases like Pile is this: the plaintiffs know that performance of the injunction would be inefficient.
. 21. See Steven ShaveD, Acquisition and Disclosure ofInfonnation PrUrr to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON.20 (1994) .
22. The ideas in this section will be presented more fully in a forthcoming article, Ian Ayres &: Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient PerJonnance (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
23. See, e.g.,Judge Richard Posner's decision in NMthemIndianaPub. Servo Co. v. Carbon Coun~Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 279-80 (7th Cir. 1986 ) (stating that~Carbon County is seeking specific performance in order to have bargaining leverage with NIPSCO, and we can think ofno reason why the law should give it such leverage"). Nonetheless, these plaintiffs ask the court to order inefficient behavior so that they can induce the defendant to pay to avoid the inefficiency. It is presumptively inefficient for plaintiffs to ask courts to order inefficient performance. Such behavior by plaintiffs creates needless bargaining costs, and when bargaining fails, results in inefficient performance. Moreover, these plaintiffs (and their lawyers) seem to be perpetrating a fraud on the court. The plaintiffs represent that no amount of monetary damages would be sufficient to make them whole and then, before the ink is dry on the nyunction, they turn around and try to sell their injunctive rights for money.
One way to deter such behavior would be for judges to issue "inalienable nyunctions" whenever they thought that the plaintiff was seeking inefficient performance. 25 An inalienable injunction would not only order the defendant to perform but would also prohibit the defendant from pa~~the plaintiff money as an alternative to discharging this duty.
2 The prospect of an inalienable injunction would deter some plaintiffs from seeking inefficient performance. In the encroachment context, for example, monetary damages of $500 may look more attractive to a plaintiff than having the defendant move the wall an inch.
25. The common law already at times calls upon judges to assess the efficiency of iryunctions. See R:EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §826(a) (1979) (stating nuisance is unreasonable if"the gravity ofthe harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct~). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and the Costs ofDetemlining Property Rights, 14J. LEGALSTUD. 13 (1985) .
26. The inalienability would only restrict the plaintifffrom selling the benefits of the iryunction back to the defendant. For example, if the ixyunction ordered a seller to specifically perform its promise to supply widgets, the buyer could of course resell the widgets to anyone else in the world-it simply couId not sell its right to receive widgets to theseUer.
Implementing inalienable injunctions creates at least two complications. First, both plaintiff and defendant. not withstanding the settlement prohibition, would have an expost incentive to agree to payment instead of inefficient performance. To make the . injunction truly inalienable, therefore, judges would probably need to place a jUdicial lien on the defendant's property that would be lifted only upon showing that the ixyunction had been performed. And second, the courts would need to prohibit monetary settlements after the defendant had irrevocably opted for an injunction (instead of monetary damages). If defendants could irrevocably opt for injunctive relief early in litigation, then plaintiffs would have the same incentives to settle for inflated amounts before the injunction actually issued. For this reason, the courts should probably give the defendant a choice of an inalienable injunction only at a late stage in the proceeding (possibly after the liability determination). See generally, Ayres &: Madison, supra note 22.
HarvardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 21 While judicially imposed inalienability harnesses the defendant's information and guides defendants to seek injunctions more often when perfonning the injunction is actually efficient, we can do still better. The problem with judicially imposed inalienability is that judges do not have perfect information about when performing an injunction would be inefficient (that is, when the defendant's cost of performance is greater than the plaintiff's benefit from performance). Accordingly, judges might mistakenly impose inalienability too rarely or too often.
27
Instead of letting the judge decide whether an injunction should be inalienable, it is better to let the defendant decide. Inalienability is supposed to deter the plaintifffrom threatening enforcement of inefficient injunctions by making those threats not credible. But the defendant knows better than the judge when inalienability is likely to deter the plaintifffrom seeking an injunction. Giving the defendant an inalienability option allows the defendant's private information to impede inefficient action by the plaintiff. The defendant's option constructively offsets the plaintiff's option of choosing injunctive or monetary relief.
28
These offsetting options harness both sides' information. Returning to our earlier example, a defendant encroacher should have the right (read: option) to say to the court, "Your honor, if you decide to issue an injunction against me, at least don't let the plaintiff turn around and use the injunction to extract money from me." 27. At first, it might seem that inalienability should be judicially imposed in all cases. But the possibility ofundercompensatory damages could lead to circumstances in which inalienability creates inefficiency. For example, consider an encroachment case in which the defendant's cost of performance is $10,000, the plaintiff's benefit of performance is $2,000, but the monetary damages that a coun would award are only $1,000. Under these assumptions, the injunction is inefficient ($10,000> $2,000), but because damages are not fully compensatory ($2,000 > $1,000), the plaintiff would opt for an inalienable injunction instead ofdamages-causing an $8,000 inefficiency loss. The defendant might well prefer to be subject to an alienable injunction, where if the litigants split the gains of trade, the defendant would only have to pay $6,000 to avoid its injunctive duty. In Ayres & Madison, supra note 22, we explore a system of privately imposed additur and remittitur to harness private parties' information and mitigate such problems ofsuper-or subcompensatory damages. BeJ'tJnd, 106 YALE L] . 703, 720-27 (1996) (demonstrating how reciprocal taking options can harness two parties' private information as they decide whether to take a particular piece ofproperty).
See

IV. CONCLUSION I
145
This essay has sketched three rather disparate proposals for changing contract law. But the proposals are connected by the idea of harnessing the superior knowledge of private parties. Interpretive safe harbors harness the private information of prospective contractors who can more accurately tailor the distribution of contractual obligations. Extending the Hadley principle to benefit buyers harnesses sellers' private information by encouraging disclosure of lost-profit information which will allow buyers to take more efficient precaution. Finally, giving defendants the option of making injunctions inalienable harnesses both plaintiffs' and defendants' information to deter plaintiffs from threatening inefficient enforcement.
Let me underscore that each of these proposed rules should be default rules that would allow people to reach other results when they contract for them explicitly. Yet even the process of contracting out of these proposed rules would harness the parties' information. Great strides have been made in the last twenty years in understanding the economics of imperfect information. This relatively new body of knowledge should aid Professor Manne's project of using economics to further 'Y 11 (1997) .
